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W e chose these eig h t legislative and p olicy reviews as a basis for organ izin g d ata collection because they provided an exp licit, structured o p p o rtu n ity for stakeholders and provincial govern m en ts to raise con cerns ab ou t the national health insurance p rogram .
T h e four stakeholder associations were the Canadian H osp ital Asso ciation (now the C anadian H ealth care A ssociation ), th e Canadian M ed ical A sso ciatio n , th e C anadian P u b lic H e a lth A ssociation , and the C anadian N u rses A ssociation. T h e four provincial governm ents were A lb erta, Saskatchew an, O n tario , and N o v a Scotia. N ation al associations were chosen accord in g to th e follow ing ch aracteristics:
1. T h ey w ere leading health professional and organizational stake holders rep resen tin g provincial constitu en cies.
T h ey were stakeholders m ak in g subm issions over tim e (to explore ch an ge in views).

T h ey consisted o f different types o f stakeholders (to include a range o f views).
4 . T h ey were stakeholders to w hom the issue o f m edical necessity was m ost likely to be salient.
Provincial govern m en ts were chosen to represent different regions of the country.
In review ing m aterial for the four provinces, we also looked at gov ern m en t reform d ocu m en ts for the years 1 9 8 4 to 1 9 9 2 and studied reports in w h ich th e te rm "m edical necessity," or a synonym , was used.
T he la tte r process was also used for the h ealth care associations.
In ord er to identify p o ten tial policy uses o f the co n cep t o f m edical necessity, we relied on statem en ts by individuals or grou p s th at eith er
(1 ) defined boundaries (floors or ceilin gs) for services, provid ers, or delivery sites to be included (versus exclu d ed ) as insured benefits under publicly funded h ealth care p rogram s a n d th at alluded to reasons or criteria or processes th at are replicable across ju risd ictio n s; or (2 ) alluded to a recogn ition th at there was no process or criterio n for d oin g so. 
W edding th e M eaning s to T h e ir H isto ry
W h a t P h y s i c i a n s a n d H o s p i t a l s D o
A t no tim e have we ever, in this cou n try, com e to a realization o f w h at is an essential h ealth care serv ice___ It appears th a t an yth in g th a t is provided by a physician to a p atien t is an essential health care ser v ice___ (M cP h erso n 1 9 8 4 ) Insured m ed ical services un d er th e 1 9 6 6 M ed ical Care A c t and th e 1 9 8 4 Canada H ealth A c t w ere identified by p rovid er as required services th at physicians provided. Insured hosp ital services u nder the 1 9 8 4 A c t were defined by settin g as m ed ically necessary services p rovided in the hos pital. B ecause these term s w ere not defined, responsibility for d eter m in in g w h ich services m e t these im p licit criteria was left to physicians, who applied th eir clin ical ju d g em en t to individual p atien ts. B y im p li cation, this m ean t th a t if physicians p rovided a service, it m u st be Canadians during this period trusted the professional authority of medicine as an institution and physicians as practitioners. This author ity was sustained by the perceived dominance of medical expertise within the health division o f labor (Freidson 1970a,b; Coburn, Torrance, and Kaufert 1983; Torrance 1987) . The institutionalization o f medical knowl edge in abstract theory and scientific facts, combined with a long and arduous training period, led easily to the perception that medicine was an exact science. It followed that, in applying this knowledge, there would be little room for differences o f opinion or discretion in clinical judgment. Physicians would provide only scientifically proven, needed care (Lomas 1990b) . The absence of federal criteria and processes to determine which services were medically necessary, and which were not, reinforced the belief that individual clinical judgment was the accepted approach to resolving this issue. Finally, medical necessity was simply overshadowed by other, more pressing issues in the health policy agenda. Im plem enting provincial medical care plans, rising health care costs, changes to the federal fund ing formula for cost-shared programs, controversy over the extent of extra-billing and user charges, allegations o f federal underfunding and of provincial diversion o f health care funds were all major policy issues requiring attention (Charles and Badgley 1987 Roos, Wennberg, and McPherson 1988; Wennberg 1990; Iscoe et al. 1994) , dispelling the illusion that medicine was an exact science with no room for discretion in clinical judgement (Lomas and Contandriopoulos 1994) . In addition, scientific evidence suggested that many medical services were either unevaluated or ineffective (Berwick 1989; Lomas 1990a ). The definition of comprehensiveness under the Canada Health Act also came under increasing attack. Some groups complained that the concept of medically necessary services, the foundation o f comprehen siveness, was being interpreted too broadly because it included whatever physicians wanted to include-a "blank check" approach (Deber, Ross, and Catz 1994) . Others interpreted it as being too narrow, as restricting insured services to those provided by physicians and hospitals, exclud ing community care (Rolfes 1979; Canadian Hospital Association 1984; Canadian Nurses Association 1984b) . Those who stood to gain from an expanded definition were the most adamant in voicing concerns. The
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Canadian Nurses Association, for example, lobbied for public funding of services provided by nurses as entry points to the health care system (Canadian Nurses Association 1982 , 1984a . A third complaint was the failure of the definition of comprehensiveness to keep pace with chang ing (and broadening) definitions o f health and health care determinants (Canadian Hospital Association 1982 . In 1991, the Canadian Hospital Association argued that, if govern ments wanted to increase control over the definition of medically nec essary insured services, they would have to decide how to define them.
For example:
1. Should all health services performed by a "recognized" health care professional or in a "recognized" provider facility be included on the insured services list unless specifically excluded? or 1. Should insured health services be identified on an established, limited list to which additions require justification by a "recog nized" health care professional/provider, possibly based on formal technology assessment? (Canadian Hospital Association 1 9 9 1 ,1 3 ).
By the m id -1990s, opinion was shifting toward the second criterion.
The convergence o f cost-control issues, a decline in belief in the infal libility of clinical judgement, and an increased faith in the ability of scientific evidence to identify "essential" or "core" services resulted in a sharp decline in credibility for the open-ended meaning o f medical necessity as "what physicians and hospitals do."
"The M aximum We Can A fford"
Although the concept o f medical necessity is ambiguous, it has taken on new life as governments and insuring bodies seek a way of defining and lim iting health benefits. Basic benefit packages derive from the concept o f medically necessary care or "essential" services___The concept of essential services has been an appealing one to those at tempting to restrict the costs o f health p lan s,. . . (Deber, Ross, and Catz 1994, 1 7 -1 8 ) The Canada Health Act imposed financial sanctions on provinces that permitted extra-billing and user charges. As one consequence, medical associations lobbied hard to obtain global increases in the provincial medical care budgets, which would translate into increases in physi cians' incomes. Provincial governments, in turn, faced federally imposed limits to the Established Programs Financing (E P F ) growth formula in the m id-1980s and beyond. W h ile the federal EPF grants for health (and postsecondary education) were initially designed to increase annu ally at the same rate as the GNP, the Conservative government in 1986 revised the formula, linking EPF increases to the G N P minus 2 percent.
Subsequently, in the 1 990 and 1991 federal budgets, total annual EPF grants to the provinces were frozen for five years (Rachlis and Kushner 1994) . These changes were intended to stabilize the federal contribution to the provinces for health care and to delink this contribution from provincial cost increases (Charles and Badgley 1987) .
Federal funding policies resulted in the provinces assuming a higher proportion o f health care costs relative to the federal government, which led them to search intensively for ways to lim it public spending for health care (approximately one-third of provincial government expen ditures). To justify cost-cutting initiatives, provincial governments be gan to reconstruct the meaning of medical necessity from "what physicians and hospitals do" to "the maximum we can afford." Medical necessity was regarded as a potential cost-cutting policy tool to transform the federal floor of insured health benefits (all medically necessary services) into the provinces* preferred ceiling (the maximum insured benefits that provinces can afford).
The issue that remained unresolved throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s was how to translate the concept o f medical necessity into a specific policy process that would clarify the criteria for determining which services to retain on publicly insured lists and which to remove in order to save public dollars. The attempts by provincial governments to remove services from their benefit schedules during this period were largely ad hoc, arbitrary, opportunistic, and "driven by the need to save money" (Deber, Ross and Catz 199 4 , 27) .
In 1 9 85, for example, the Alberta government removed several ser vices from the list: family planning counseling, tubal ligations, vasec tomies, and mammoplasty. D eleting them created a presumption that they were no longer medically necessary (Canadian Bar Association Task
Force on Health Care 1994, 37). But when the Alberta public protested the cuts, the health m inister was forced to reinstate most o f the delisted services, creating the presumption that they were once again medically necessary. This experience highlighted the arbitrariness o f provincial processes for defining medically necessary services.
The desire to cut costs led to other delisting exercises in the early 1990s (Tuohy 1994; Deber, Mhatre, and Baker 1994; Rachlis 1995; Pringle 1995) . These also lacked credibility, undermining the use of medical necessity as an explicit and practical policy tool for defining "the maximum we can afford" (Pringle 1995) . The various delisting activities undertaken by provincial govern ments in the 1980s and early 1990s highlighted a serious weakness in the entitlem ent to health care o f Canadian citizens:
From this brief review, it seems clear that the provinces have not defined "medically required services" or the criteria on which they are established, but have simply listed them in regulations which may be changed through administrative procedures. Criteria for such changes fare] not set out in legislation. Public consultation is not mandatory, nor is it common practice. This reveals a great weakness at the core of the entitlem ent to health care in Canada. (Canadian Bar Associa tion Task Force on Health Care 1994, 39) By the early 1990s, cost control advocates were desperate to find more credible criteria and processes to use in restricting service cover age. These would be found in the "evidence-based medicine" and health technology assessment movements, which had gained their own mo mentum over the previous two decades. B elief in the ability o f scientific evidence to identify in a more rational way medically necessary (effective and appropriate) health services in the aid o f cost control is now wide spread among Canadian national health care association and coalitions.
Advocacy of these views also means that, unwittingly or not, these associations are caught in a process that potentially promotes the pri vatization of health care because, unless delisted services (those deemed not scientifically justified) are banned altogether, they are likely to become available through the private sector.
Some provincial governments have recently found a way to preclude the privatization of services that they no longer wish to fund publicly:
a particular service is retained on the provincial list of insured benefits, but the minister of health has the legal power to pay nil to physicians providing that service through the public sector. This process is called deinsuring rather than delisting. Because the particular service remains on the public list, it cannot be provided in the private sector. Yet, there is a clear and compelling financial incentive for doctors not to provide it in the public system.
Although provincial governments hope to achieve substantial cost savings by delisting services on the grounds that they are not medically necessary, experience to date in Britain and in Ontario does not bear this out. Few purchasers in England, when given authority to define a uni versal health care package, chose to make procedures or services unavail able, and little money was saved. Services that were delisted were marginal to the activities in the National H ealth Service in terms o f cost and tended to blur "social and medical judgem ents" (K lein 1994, 107) .
In was impeded by difficulties in accurately documenting cost savings from the delisting exercise (Pringle 1995) . Many of the procedures recommended for delisting were judged to be medically warranted for some patients but not for others, and billing codes from the Ontario Health Insurance Plan did not adequately specify the difference between the two, which made it difficult to predict the cost savings that would result from barring the funding for some indications but not for others.
These experiences, while lim ited, suggest that delisting specific ser vices because they are deemed medically unnecessary may not substan tially save public funds. The predominant and long-term effect on costs will more likely be a shift o f funding from the public to the private sector and an overall increase in health care costs (both public and private). Opinions may well vary regarding the appropriate threshold of affordability (i.e., the point when maximum affordability has been reached), making the definition o f medical necessity as "the maximum we can afford" an ever-moving, often im plicit and variable target, de pending on who is making this value judgment.
"W hat Is Scientifically Ju stified "
Value for money is not explicit in the concept of "medically necessary services." There is a growing recognition o f the need to apply evidencebased, clinical knowledge to defining the comprehensive lists of in sured services to which th^ Canada Health Act guarantees universal access across all jurisdictions. (Canadian Hospital Association 1994,
26)
By into an explicit evaluation process for identifying a smaller subset of "core" effective and appropriate health services from the more compre hensive service package that is currently publicly funded. This "core" would then become the new (and lowered) provincial floor, or minimum standard of mandatory provincial service coverage. At the same time, the evidentiary standards applied to retain a service as part of the "core" would be raised. Health care associations endorse the scientific approach for both cost and quality reasons (Canadian Hospital Association 1989 , 1991 Canadian Healthcare Association 1996) . Some have developed scientific criteria, which are applied as sequential "screens" to evaluate the quality of specific health services and to identify those that are medically nec essary, "core," or "essential" (Deber, Ross, and Catz 1994 This framework has three sequential policy filters: efficacy/effectiveness, appropriateness, and affordability (H ealth Action Lobby 1994, 12-13).
The Canadian Medical Association has also developed a framework for determining "core" services, which they, in turn, define as "services that are available to everyone as funded/insured by a government pro gram" (Canadian Medical Association 1994, 86) . The criteria to be applied are quality of care, ethics, and economics (Canadian Medical Association 1994, 65). These two frameworks, as well as others, propose using scientific evidence as the first screen through which services must pass in order to be considered for public funding.
W hile scientific evidence is now seen by many as the means to lim it service coverage rationally and to reduce costs, during the early 1980s both the Canadian Nurses Association and the Canadian Hospital As sociation invoked scientific evidence to justify expanding service cover age as a means to control costs. The Canadian Nurses Association, for example, argued that the Burlington randomized trial o f the nurse prac titioner demonstrated the cost-effectiveness o f nurse practitioners, com pared with physicians, in providing primary care services (Spitzer et al. 1974; Denton et al. 1982 Denton et al. , 1983 ) and that nursing services should be included under public health insurance programs (Canadian Nurses As sociation 1984a, 1 9 8 6 , 1988). The current enthusiasm for applying scientific evidence to the deter mination o f medically necessary services for public health insurance coverage masks several problems with this approach (Blustein and Marmor 1992). It assumes the availability o f accurate, reliable information about the effectiveness, appropriateness, and costs o f different treat ments, as well as agreement on the most appropriate outcomes to mea sure. In reality, this type o f information is often patchy, incomplete, or nonexistent. As Rudolf K lein argues:
Policy making, if it is to be rational, must start by acknowledging that health care is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and that the information required for central decision making will always be inadequate. The hope that "science" will allow us to roll back the frontiers of ignorance to the point where it is possible to define a lim ited package of health care, which is defensible because it is based on demonstrated effectiveness, is therefore likely to prove delusory. (K lein 1994, 112) Practice guidelines are advocated by several national health care associ ations as the mechanism to promote appropriate care. The Canadian Medical Association, for example, has argued:
Governments may achieve cost reductions for health care services in a number o f ways including deinsuring a particular procedure or service by lim iting the availability of an insured service through the use of practice guidelines. The guidelines method . . . may include recommendations about such things as risk factors and the number of times in a given period a test should be done-[The guidelines method] has the advantage o f being less politically contentious and less vulnerable to legal challenge, as it does not remove needed health care services across the board, but rather depends on a review of an individual patient s situation. (Canadian Medical Association 1994,22) Guidelines, while helpful, will not solve the issue o f appropriateness. Some practice guidelines are contentious or conflicting; for many treat ments, no guidelines exist. Although guidelines are presumably based on the best scientific evidence available, it is not always clear that one can extrapolate average group outcomes from clinical trials to individual patients. Opinions differ on methodological issues, such as whose views should count in assessing treatment benefits and harm (Eddy 1991) . Most important, from a clinical perspective, the appropriateness of any given treatment cannot be determined in isolation from the particular circumstances o f a given patient because the same procedure may work well for one patient but not for another. Moreover, such a policy would require an elaborate appeals process to review situations where physicians provided care that they considered effective and appropriate, even though that particular indication was not included or was simply not addressed in the relevant guideline.
Some investigators in the United States (M atchar et al. 1992; Leape et al. 1993; M cGlynn et al. 1994 ) have developed a system for measur ing appropriateness that relies on expert panels. A list o f indications for a particular procedure is defined, based on a review of the literature (Matchar et al. 1992) . The indications are then presented to an expert panel. The panel rates whether it would be appropriate or inappro priate to perform the procedure on a given patient with specified indi cations (Hopkins et al. 1993 
C . C h a r le s et a l.
A fourth meaning o f medical necessity is "what is consistently funded across all provinces." The national medical care insurance program was designed to provide equity in entitlem ent and access to medical care for all Canadians, as measured by a m inim um level of consistency in the comprehensiveness o f publicly insured services. In a reversal of mean ing, this legal requirement gave rise to the notion that if a medical service was publicly funded consistently across all provinces, it must be medically necessary.
In fact, over tim e, the scope o f medical coverage did not change significantly from the base of coverage initially established by provinces as they entered the national program (Tuohy 1994) . W hat did expand was public coverage of services in addition to hospital and medical care. As fiscal pressures increased, many provincial governments sub sequently either reduced or eliminated service coverage in these ancillary areas or introduced copayments. The Ontario Conserv ative government, for example, introduced a copayment for prescription drug benefits for seniors in 1996. The government argued that this policy did not violate the federal condition o f comprehensiveness because drug benefits were not medically necessary, meaning that they were not part of the original service package that all participating provinces were required to provide (W alker 1995, A 18) .
By 1994, variability in coverage existed across provinces in nursing homes and other long-term-care facility services, out-of-country ben efits, prescription drugs, dental, optometric, chiropractic, and physio therapy programs, and in requirements for payment o f health insurance premiums (Crichton, Hsu, and Tsang 1994) . Recent provincial delist ing exercises have created new variations across provinces, even in med ical service coverage. Such disparities have raised concerns that consistency across provinces in entitlem ent and access to medically necessary ser vices has been eroded. This, in turn, has led to recommendations that the provincial and federal governments renegotiate the terms of the publicly funded health care package. In Alberta, we offer a range o f home and community services, as well as support for physical therapy, optometry, and other services. None of these additional services is recognized by the Canada Health Act and their availability varies from province to province. W e need na tional standards for basic services that provincial health plans must fully cover. These standards must set out the appropriate responsi bilities of the public sector and what the role o f the private sector could be. (Alberta Health 1995b) Delisting some services that are currently publicly funded would also benefit physicians by providing them with an unregulated source o f in come outside the public sector. This is acknowledged in the Canadian Medical Associations report on core and comprehensive health care ser vices: Preliminary analysis suggests that, under the right circumstances, strategic [delisting] or deinsurance can be economically better for both patients and physicians (Canadian Medical Association 1994, xii).
A federal-provincial renegotiation o f publicly funded services would create an opportunity to expand service coverage, in keeping with a broader definition o f health. Bu t the opposite is also true, and perhaps more likely. In this fiscal clim ate, the outcome could well be a consis tent, but more restricted, package o f public service benefits.
The Canadian Healthcare Association has recently developed a pro posal that would appear no longer to require the federal government to play a role in ensuring provincial consistency in publicly funded ser vices. The proposal recommends that a national consensus be developed on core insured health benefits, defined as beneficial or desired outcomes of a clinical intervention (Canadian Healthcare Association 1 9 9 6 ,1 6 ). Core insured benefits would be developed "not just based on cost, but on health goals, evidence-based outcomes and social values" (Canadian Healthcare Association 1996, 17). Each province would then develop a service list of insured core services that have passed an evidence-based test. Such services are defined as "a set clinical regimen or procedure for a certain condition" (Canadian Healthcare Association 1996, 15). Be cause the development o f core services is considered a provincial respon sibility, there appears to be no requirement in this model for consistency in service entitlem ent across provinces; rather, a national consensus is proposed on desired outcomes or benefits that m ight be met through a variety o f interventions. Few details are provided on how this plan would actually work in practice.
Funding within Provinces
The Health and Community Services Act states that core programs and services are those prescribed programs that a required authority is obliged to provide. (Prince Edward Island Government 1994, 3) Establishing a consistent package o f health services benefits for resi dents within a province is also an important policy objective for provin cial governments that have devolved authority to the regional level. This includes all provinces except Ontario (Lomas, Woods, and Veenstra 1997) . Nearly all these provinces have developed reports on broad "core" service categories that each regional jurisdiction must provide as a min imum provincial floor (Hurley, Lomas, and Bhatia 1994; Prince Edward Island Provincial Government 1994; British Columbia Ministry of Health and Ministry Responsible for Seniors 1994; Nova Scotia Regional Health Board 1995; Saskatchewan Health 1995; Alberta Health 1995a) . Thus, two very different trends are emerging around the meaning o f "core" services. On the one hand, stakeholder association debates over core or essential services to be retained on provincial health insurance lists focus on specific services or procedures. On the other, provincial reports re garding devolution activities focus on broad service categories or pro grams like prevention or rehabilitation. Each uses the term "core services" to define a floor, or m inim um standard, o f service coverage, but in very different ways. The provincial reports emphasize a broad view o f health and the importance o f non-health-care determinants o f health. Their plans typically include service categories that traditionally have not been part o f the health care system and lie outside the current purview of the Canada Health Act. These service categories tend to be justified by reference to general literature on cost-effectiveness rather than by specific research studies.
In summary, there has been an evolution (some m ight say revolution)
in the meaning(s) of medical necessity over time. The concept has evolved as follows:
• from a undimensional to a multidimensional concept, assuming various meanings • from an im plicit, seemingly self-evident, and widely accepted prin ciple of the Canadian national health insurance program to a con cept whose usage in health policy debates is problematic, complex, malleable, and confusing
• from a concept closely linked to the comprehensiveness standard in the Canada Health Act to one that some now think should be delinked and attached to a smaller subset o f comprehensiveness, which is defined as the core
• from an assumed descriptive principle of service inclusion to an evaluative criterion o f service exclusion
• from a minimum federal floor o f services that must be insured by each province to a maximum provincial ceiling o f insured services (the maximum we can afford)
• from a concept whose meaning was derived inductively by example and illustration to one whose meaning is increasingly derived deductively by reference to abstract principles and "scientific' algorithms The Funeral?
We have argued that the concept of medical necessity has taken on different meanings over tim e, depending on the perceived policy needs of the day. During the decade following the introduction o f universal medical care, the concept slept quietly, like R ip Van W inkle, embedded comfortably in legislation and attracting little policy attention. In the m id -1980s, policy makers "discovered" medical necessity, woke it from a long sleep, and capitalized on its m alleability to attach different mean ings to the concept in pursuit o f their own policy agendas. The result is confusion over the array o f meanings and how these are used in current health policy debates.
The meaning o f medical necessity is not intrinsic to it but, rather, depends on how people interpret and use the concept. Meanings are created through an interpretive and interactive process (Berger and Luckmann 19 67; Blum er 1969) . The history o f medical necessity can be seen as a history o f conflict over meanings and attempts by various groups to gain public support for their particular view and for the "facts" that they claim about it (Gusfield 1992) . As Stone argues (1 9 8 8 , 121), meanings can be used to "create associations that lend legitimacy and attract sup port to a course o f action." Whoever gains control over the definition of a particular problem will likely be the one to set the policy agenda for its resolution.
Viewed in this context, attempts to achieve consensus on the mean ing o f medical necessity are likely to fail. Stakeholders have a vested interest in preserving their favored meaning and in advocating for its broader acceptance. Consensus regarding a definition o f medical neces sity is difficult to achieve precisely because its value to stakeholders lies in the ease with which it can be construed to serve multiple policy and ideological ends. For this reason, new meanings are likely to emerge over tim e, carrying ever new policy agendas into the health care arena.
As one example, the recent Ontario government omnibus legislation (bill 26) contains a provision enabling the general manager o f the On tario Health Insurance Plan to recover post hoc or to withhold payments to physicians for medically unnecessary services (Ontario Ministry of Health 1996) . This implies that medical necessity is to take on a policy role, not only to control costs but also to identify alleged cases of phy sician abuse.
The ambiguity o f the concept o f medical necessity is also advanta geous to the federal government. In the face o f provincial challenges to the national health insurance standards precipitated by both cost cut ting and privatization ideology, the federal government can use the It is inevitable that values will shape the meanings attached to the concept of medical necessity and its use. To a large extent, however, these values have not been made explicit by stakeholders advocating a particular meaning. Acknowledging the values and goals that underlie various interpretations o f medical necessity would help to illum inate more explicitly the different value com m itm ents of stakeholders, which can then be the subject o f more thorough public debate.
If it seems unlikely that a consensus can be reached on a definition o f medical necessity, should we instead work on developing a process and the criteria for assessing medically necessary services to be publicly funded? Clearly, many Canadian national health care associations would answer yes to this question. W e, however, offer a more guarded opinion.
The extent to which scientific evidence is available and can be applied effectively to this task is sharply limited. Equally difficult methodolog ical problems surround the task o f eliciting, aggregating, and integrat ing individual consumer and collective (community) values about specific health outcomes and priority services to achieve them. Even if this task could be accomplished, it is doubtful that the issue o f appropriateness could be effectively managed by practice guidelines specifying the con ditions for making insured services available at a provincial level be cause of the context-specific nature o f treatm ent decision-making and the role of patient preferences in this process (Lomas and Lavis 1996) .
The focus on medical necessity also locks us into a policy framework of preserving the status quo. The need to assess the medical necessity o f individual services derives from the fee-for-service reimbursement sys tem, in which physicians are paid a fixed price for each service provided on the benefit list (Hurley et al. 1996) . Support for alternative funding arrangements that do not require exhaustive lists o f services as a basis of reimbursement makes the issue o f medical necessity much less prob lematic (although by no means elim inating it completely). In a capi tated system, for example, the funder specifies general types o f care to be funded (e.g., primary care), but reimbursement to the organization is not tied to the cost o f each service. The organization can choose to deliver services through a variety o f providers, not just physicians, cre ating opportunities for more cost-effective care through the substitution of less costly health care providers for those providing more expensive care.
It seems an obvious point that the meaning o f necessary services depends, to a large extent, on the goals o f the health care system (Sharpe and Faden 1996) . Yet there is no consensus in Canada on this issue.
Goals can be narrowly or broadly defined. Services deemed necessary to achieve one set o f health goals-physical health, for example-may not be sufficient to achieve a different one-well-being perhaps being an other (Hurley et al. 1996) . It is important for Canadians to develop a consensus on health care goals in order to set the policy framework for discussions o f necessary services.
Currently, the concept o f medical necessity carries a heavy policy load for which it is ill equipped. The focus on developing screening tools to differentiate between medically necessary and unnecessary services cre ates an illusion that a more rational process for making such decisions will resolve long-standing health care issues like cost control and access to health care according to need. This is unlikely to be the case. bating because these will set the broad boundaries within which struc tural reforms to health care can take place. These value issues include, for example, the extent to which Canadians want to retain the national standards, which level o f government, if any, should be responsible for m onitoring these standards, and the balance between public and private funding for health care. A myopic focus on defining medical necessity draws attention away from these important issues. -----------. 1982. Subm ission to the M in ister o f N a tio n a l H ea lth a n d W elfare on the Proposed "C a n a d a H ea lth A ct. " Ottawa.
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